The territorial disputes within the South China Sea kind one of the crucial contentious points in worldwide relations. The disputes contain complicated and overlapping claims from seven events across the maritime space: the mainland China (the Folks’s Republic of China, PRC), Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and Taiwan (the Republic of China, ROC). The world is often thought-about to consist of 4 fundamental parts: the Paracels, the Spratlys, the Pratas and the Scarborough Shoal. Nonetheless, a key sticking level associated to the dispute is China’s U-shaped Line (see Determine 1). To this point, China has not offered a solution to the precise that means of the Line which may have implications to future resolutions. Such vagueness has led to a lot worldwide confusion and apprehension over the character of China’s declare.

Chung (2016) asserts that “the PRC’s official ambiguity over the road’s that means performs a big position in perpetuating the dispute. No significant decision can emerge whether it is unclear what the PRC claims within the first place”. Miyoshi (2012) presents the problem it poses to the worldwide attorneys because it raises the query whether or not “it’s attainable or permissible in any respect to assert a sea space encircled by a sequence of dotted or damaged traces as a substitute of an unbroken line”. Furthermore, some students consider that China’s obscure place might threaten the credibility of the United Nations Conference for the Regulation of the Sea (UNCLOS) on the regional degree. For example, Supriyanto (2016) argues that China’s insistence on the U-shaped Line “devalues Indonesia’s perception within the sanctity of UNCLOS”. In response to Supriyanto, Indonesia discovered the Line problematic as a result of it “clearly lacks worldwide authorized foundation”. Due to this fact, the worldwide neighborhood has been significantly inquisitive about seeing a full clarification from China. If China is to carry fruitful negotiations with surrounding nations, it’s important that the that means of the Line be completely clarified.

Determine 1: China’s U-shaped Line refers back to the crimson segmented traces within the map (Ponnudurai, 2014).

However China faces a dilemma in the case of the correct definition and the reason for it’s at the very least partly associated to the ROC on Taiwan. Till now, few students have acknowledged this level within the literature of the English language. Some students within the academia might have documented the ROC’s historic actions within the South China Sea however they didn’t analyse their ramifications on immediately’s worldwide negotiations. Due to this fact, this text argues that the Taiwan issue has added to the problem to China’s definition of the U-shaped Line and to the bargaining course of amongst related states.

To grasp the Taiwan issue within the clarification of the U-shaped Line, it’s vital to try the historic linkage between the ROC and the Chinese language declare to the South China Sea. Mainly, the ROC, which was based in 1912 after the autumn of the Qing Dynasty, is the creator of the U-shaped Line and made necessary efforts to claim its declare to the South China Sea. At the moment the ROC regime dominated the bulk a part of the mainland China. These actions are deeply linked to the inspiration of immediately’s Chinese language declare.

As early as 1928, the Guangdong Provincial Authorities of the ROC despatched a gaggle of consultants to the Paracels to research its geography. In the identical yr, the ROC authorities acquired the primary map of the Paracels after the investigators completed the mission. This might be seen as an preliminary try of the ROC to manage the South China Sea (Chen, 2016). Within the early Nineteen Thirties, there was disagreement between the ROC and France relating to the sovereignty of the Paracels and the Spratlys. France primarily based the declare on its colonial rule of Vietnam. However the ROC authorities protested in opposition to the French declare and quoted the 1887 Sino-French Conference on the boundary line between China and Vietnam. Its that means was that the Paracels and the Spratlys had been east to the French territory stipulated by the treaty. Regardless of this, France introduced the occupation of 9 islands within the Spratlys in July 1933, which triggered ROC’s protest later (Chang, 1991). Additionally in response to the French claims, in June 1933 the ROC Inside Ministry established the Committee for the Overview of Water and Land Maps, which was accountable for investigating the ROC’s territory. The Committee settled the names (in Chinese language and English) of islands within the South China Sea and divided the South China Sea into 4 elements (Paracels, Pratas, Spratlys and the Macclesfield Financial institution) in December 1934. In April 1935, the Committee revealed a map of the South China Sea however this model didn’t embrace the U-shaped Line (Chen, 2016).

In the course of the Second World Conflict, the ROC authorities didn’t have a lot vitality to cope with the South China Sea, however its actions within the area resumed shortly after the Conflict. In October and November 1946, a Chinese language naval squadron visited these islands and assisted in organising radio and meteorological stations (Shen, 2002). In 1947, the ROC authorities launched the “Map of the Location of the South China Sea Islands”, which was the primary official map to incorporate the Paracels, Prats, Spratlys and the Macclesfield Financial institution encircled by the U-shaped Line, consisting of 11 dashes. Within the following yr, the ROC dispatched warships to the archipelago to conduct surveys and erect landmarks (Wang, 2010). After 1949, the ROC authorities retreated to Taiwan because it misplaced the warfare with the Chinese language Communist Occasion (CCP). But it surely doesn’t imply that its actions associated to the South China Sea stopped. For example, in 1956 the ROC authorities despatched a naval contingent to the Spratlys after the Philippine named Tomas Cloma claimed the invention and occupation of the “Freedomland”. In April 1993, the ROC Govt Yuan accepted the Tips for the Coverage on the South China Sea wherein it re-asserted its declare on the South China Sea and greater than some other, used the strongest time period “historic waters” to seek advice from the ocean space (Wang, 2010). In 2005, the ROC suspended the rule and it might be interpreted that Taiwan discontinued its claims to the “historic waters”. Nonetheless, the U-shaped Line continues to outlive on Taiwan’s official map of the South China Sea (Tsai, 2016). Thus, its present that means stays obscure.

The PRC inherited the U-shaped Line from the ROC after the PRC took energy within the mainland since 1949. In August 1951, PRC Premier Zhou Enlai made a press release in response to the upcoming San Francisco Treaty, the treaty to formally finish the Second World Conflict between Japan and the Allies. Zhou (1951) introduced that: “Though they had been as soon as occupied when the Japanese imperialists launched a warfare of aggression, they had been all obtained by the Chinese language authorities (the ROC’s) after Japan surrendered. The Central Folks’s Authorities of the Folks’s Republic of China hereby declares: The inviolable sovereignty of the Folks’s Republic of China within the Spratly Island and the Paracel Islands is not going to be affected in any manner, no matter whether or not or not the USA and Britain have provisions on the draft of Japan Peace Treaty.” Zhou’s assertion was seen as “the PRC’s first worldwide pronouncement relating to her claims within the South China Sea”. Though the PRC made no bodily strikes within the area till the Nineteen Seventies, it fashioned an necessary authorized foundation of immediately’s Chinese language declare (Granados, 2006).

The difficulty for the CCP is that, any distinction between the mainland and Taiwan within the interpretation of the Line will doubtlessly trigger issues. Within the authorized sense, if the outlined nature of the Line from Beijing is completely different from Taipei’s, the worldwide viewers will inevitably ask why and presumably problem the legitimacy of the Line primarily based on such distinction. Additionally, Wang (2015) has observed that whereas the overseas viewers have discovered the U-shaped Line unacceptable, there’s a group of home viewers in China that regards China’s assertion inadequate to guard its pursuits. To be particular, if the PRC’s ultimate definition is extensively regarded by the home viewers as weaker than the ROC’s model, the CCP’s skill to defend the nationwide sovereignty shall be referred to as into query. Nonetheless, if the CCP adopts a really harsh method, it might discover the aim too bold to ship, which nonetheless might trigger each home and worldwide challenges. The worldwide viewers might discover it too aggressive whereas the home one might imagine it’s unable to honour its guarantees.

Quite the opposite, if Taiwan dumps the Line altogether, the CCP might really feel stabbed within the again as a result of the ROC is the creator and joint proprietor of this Line. Realistically, Taiwan has no bodily energy or true inclination to occupy all of the islands inside the U-shaped Line. It additionally doesn’t wish to harm its relationship with the Southeast Asia. If Taiwan does give it up, the credibility of the Line shall be inevitably impaired. So, the CCP really hopes that Taiwan can preserve a level of energy on it. A senior professional from China’s Nationwide Institute of the South China Sea Research (NISCSS) expressed “three crimson traces” to the Tsai Ing-wen administration in 2016, which reveals that the think-tank neighborhood in China was actually being attentive to this danger (Zang, 2016). Among the many three crimson traces, the primary one was: the Tsai authorities should not declare the abandonment of the U-shaped Line. It was thought that on account of exterior stress, Tsai had the chance to compromise on this level. (The opposite two crimson traces had been: the Tsai authorities should insist the Taiping Island as an island, not a rock; and that the Taiping Island should not be open to different nations for army use.)

To make sure, there are Taiwanese students who’ve additionally realized this drawback and they’re keen to debate the problem with their mainland counterparts. Wang Kuan-hsiung (2019), Professor at Nationwide Taiwan Regular College, talked about his hope relating to the cross-strait educational exchanges: “We hope that in educational analysis, the understanding of sure issues between the 2 sides of the Taiwan strait might be extra constant. If I can write one thing that turns into a consensus, I shall be very happy with it.” Since 2002, students from the mainland China and Taiwan have been exchanging concepts within the annual Cross-strait Discussion board on the South China Sea hosted by the NISCSS, which is aimed to strengthen educational contacts and to advertise South China Sea analysis cooperation. From 2010, there’s additionally an annual Evaluation Report on the Scenario within the South China Sea, which is written by students from the mainland China and Taiwan. Within the 2011 version (Liu F.Okay. and Wu S.C., 2012), the necessity for coordination was explicitly expressed: “relating to the particular authorized foundation of the U-shaped Line and its authorized that means, each side ought to discover a consensus to additional try for the appropriate to talk internationally on the problem of the South China Sea. Thus, what’s pressing for the 2 sides of the strait is that they need to conduct analysis and dialogue on the collation of historic archives, in order that the stance on the U-shaped Line might be the identical and may kind consensus. On the similar time, an acceptable and affordable assertion ought to be generated in accordance with the UNCLOS and significantly, on factors the place they could contradict.”

Nonetheless, regardless of the arduous work from students for years, the 2 sides of the Taiwan Strait have but to succeed in an settlement on what the U-shaped Line really means. Absolutely the basis for such problem lies within the ambiguity of the Line itself. When the Line was first drawn in 1947, no definition was given then. These days, varied theories emerge from each side of the strait. Some argue that the Line represents a “island attribution line” whereas others consider that it’s the line of “historic rights”. Even with out the issue of Taiwan, the mainland China might battle to provide a particular reply by itself. However the want for coordination between the mainland China and Taiwan definitely added to the issue, as has been talked about above. Throughout Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency in Taiwan, the 2 sides of the Taiwan Strait loved a honeymoon interval wherein exchanges on financial, cultural and even political points had been easily carried out. However even throughout that point, no breakthrough was made. A part of the reason being that the governments on the 2 sides of the Taiwan Strait had political reservations. From the angle of the mainland, permitting the Taiwanese authority to take part within the clarification of the U-shaped Line, which has vital worldwide implications, would sign that Taiwan is a separate entity from the authority in Beijing, one thing that will violate the “One China” precept that the CCP offers all the things to defend. From the Taiwan’s viewpoint, siding with the Beijing authority on the problem of the South China Sea would pose a menace to its relationship with the Southeast Asia and doubtlessly damage its friendship with the USA, one thing that it can not afford to do. Given the scenario that the Tsai administration is much extra hostile to the mainland than the earlier Ma administration, the chance of collectively coordinating the that means of the U-shaped Line is even much less. Thus, even when the tutorial neighborhood can attain a comparatively constant understanding in regards to the Line, which isn’t achieved but, elevating it to the governmental degree shall be a lot more durable.

To conclude, the ROC at present situated in Taiwan is a participant within the dispute of the South China Sea. One among its elementary hyperlinks to the dispute is that it’s the creator and joint proprietor of the controversial U-shaped Line, whose that means has not been completely clarified but. A dilemma for Beijing is that any distinction within the definition of the Line will doubtlessly trigger hassle and thus it has the inducement to coordinate with Taiwan on this challenge. However on the similar time, the paradox of the problem itself and the political reservations on the governmental degree might constrain the efforts by the tutorial neighborhood from each side to succeed in a constant interpretation of the Line. Thus, within the close to future, such problem is more likely to persist and the Taiwan issue will proceed to be a barrier to China’s full clarification of the U-shaped Line. What it means to the worldwide negotiation relating to the South China Sea is that China should still preserve a level of vagueness to the U-shaped Line for fairly a while. And with out full clarification, one of the best that may be hoped for is the de-escalation of the stress within the area, not a one-off decision. On this sense, the Taiwan issue added to the prospect of a protracted bargaining course of among the many claimants.


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